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1. Introduction
The	view	 that	 truth	 is	a	primitive,	 indefinable	notion	was	of	central	
importance	to	the	originators	of	analytic	philosophy.	Moore	and	Rus-
sell	 adopted	 the	 view	after	 abandoning	 their	 idealism	 (though	 they	
soon	turned	to	correspondence	accounts),	and	Frege	subscribed	to	it	
until	the	end	of	his	life.1	But	save	for	some	attention	given	to	the	view	
by	Davidson	(1990,	1996),	primitivism	about	truth	has	laid	low	for	the	
last	century.	During	that	time,	by	far	the	dominant	force	in	the	theory	
of	truth	has	been	Tarski,	and	much	subsequent	discussion	has	been	
focused	around	the	question	of	whether	Tarski’s	work	better	motivates	
a	robust,	correspondence-style	theory	of	truth,2	or	a	more	deflationary	
approach.3	I	reject	this	dichotomy,	and	argue	in	this	paper	that	Tarski’s	
work	on	 truth	 is	actually	most	consonant	with	a	primitivist	perspec-
tive	on	truth;	hence,	his	views	should	not	be	thought	to	lend	support	
to	either	 correspondence	or	deflationary	 theories.	Given	 that	Tarski	
shows	how	to	offer	a	definition	of	truth,	the	congeniality	between	his	
views	and	primitivism	may	not	be	immediately	obvious,	and	my	aim	is	
to	draw	the	appropriate	connections.	I	do	not	argue	that	Tarski	himself	
subscribed	 to	 a	primitivist	 conception	of	 truth,	 though	 I	 shall	 show	
how	the	view	is	open	to	him,	and	is	more	amenable	to	his	views	on	
truth	than	are	the	more	familiar	theories	of	truth.
1.	 See,	inter alia,	Moore	1899,	Russell	1904,	and	Frege	1956.
2.	 See,	e. g.,	Popper	1963:	223–228	and	1979,	Davidson	1969:	758,	Jennings	1987,	
Horwich	1990:	9,	Kirkham	1992:	170,	Niiniluoto	1999,	and	Fernández	Moreno	
2001.	Woleński	argues	that	Tarski	employs	a	form	of	“weak	correspondence”	
(1993).	 Others	 demur	 from	 the	 correspondence	 interpretation:	 see,	 e. g.,	
Haack	1976	and	1978,	Keuth	1978,	Putnam	1985:	72,	Davidson	1990,	1996:	268,	
and	1999:	110,	Künne	2003:	213,	and	Simmons	2009:	555–556.
3.	 See,	 e. g.,	 Black	 1948:	 63,	 Horwich	 1982,	 Soames	 1984:	 416	 and	 1999:	 238,	
Stoutland	 1999:	 83,	 and	Patterson	 2010:	 25.	 Those	who	 argue	 against	 the	
deflationary	interpretation	include	Davidson	1990,	1996:	269,	and	1999:	110,	
Schantz	 1998,	Ketland	 1999,	Horwich	 2005,	 and	 Simmons	 2009:	 556–558.	
See	Field	 1994:	269–270	 for	an	 intermediate	view.	Obviously,	much	 turns	
on	what	exactly	is	meant	by	‘correspondence	theory’	and	‘deflationism’,	and	
so	some	subtlety	in	interpreting	these	attributions	is	called	for.	For	general	
discussion	about	how	to	interpret	Tarski’s	view	vis-à-vis	correspondence	and	
deflationism,	see	Kirkham	1992:	170–173,	Künne	2003:	208–213,	and	Patter-
son	2012:	140–143.
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what	it	 is	that	makes	truth	bearers	true;	discussion	of	the	concept	of	
truth,	by	contrast,	 focuses	on	what	 it	 is	 for	us	as	cognitive	agents	 to	
possess	a	notion	of	truth,	and	what	it	means	for	us	to	deploy	it	in	our	
thought	and	language.
Primitivism	 is	 the	 view	 that	 truth	 is	 a	 fundamental	 concept.	 As	
such,	 it	 cannot	be	analyzed,	defined,	or	 reduced	 into	concepts	 that	
are	more	 fundamental.6	Accordingly,	 primitivism	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	
traditional	substantive	theories	of	truth,	such	as	the	correspondence,	
coherence,	and	pragmatic	theories,	which	hold	that	truth,	while	a	sub-
stantive	notion,	is	nevertheless	analyzable	into	those	further	notions.	
Primitivism	is	also	opposed	to	deflationism,	which	rejects	the	claim	
of	truth’s	fundamentality.	Horwich,	for	example,	argues	that	truth	can	
be	defined,	albeit	implicitly,	by	the	T-sentences	(e. g.,	‘The	proposition	
that	2	is	prime	is	true	if	and	only	if	2	is	prime’),	which	he	claims	are	
the	“fundamental	principles”	of	truth	(1990:	18).	Primitivists,	by	con-
trast,	deny	that	there	are	any	such	fundamental	principles	about	truth.	
If	there	were,	truth	itself	wouldn’t	be	fundamental.	Far	from	being	a	
fundamental	 concept	of	preeminent	philosophical	worth,	 truth,	 say	
deflationists,	is	a	rather	innocuous	notion	of	mere	expressive	utility.
Primitivism,	 like	 the	 other	 theories	 of	 truth,	 aims	 to	 offer	 an	 ac-
count	 of	 our	 most	 general	 concept	 of	 truth,	 whatever	 it	 is	 that	 is	
shared	by	all	who	can	be	said	to	possess	the	concept,	regardless	of	
which	 language	they	speak	or	how	complex	 their	 thoughts	may	be.	
Tarski	never	attempts	to	give	such	an	account,	and	at	times	makes	re-
marks	that	might	appear	to	disparage	any	such	endeavor.	He	observes,	
for	example,	that	no	one	has	adequately	explained	to	him	what	“the	
philosophical	problem	of	truth”	is,	and	that	he	does	not	understand	
what	it	is	to	offer	the	“essence”	of	a	concept	like	truth	(1944:	361).	The	
primitivist	acknowledges	that	truth	has	no	essence,	at	 least	 if	some-
thing’s	essence	is	constituted	by	its	analysans.	Primitivism	takes	as	its	
target	our	most	basic	notion	of	truth,	against	which	the	adequacy	of	
6.	 Some	primitivists	 admit	 that	 truth	 can	be	defined,	albeit	 in	 terms	of	other	
concepts	that	are	equally	fundamental	(thereby	forming	a	circle	of	interdefin-
able	fundamental	concepts).	See	Strawson	1992	for	a	view	of	this	sort.
To	begin,	I	explain	what	primitivism	is,	and	how	it	offers	a	perspec-
tive	on	truth	that	competes	with	both	correspondence	and	deflation-
ary	theories.	 I	 then	review	the	aspects	of	Tarski’s	work	on	truth	that	
are	most	relevant	to	the	primitivist	theory	of	truth.	In	so	doing,	I	show	
how	Tarski	is	a	natural	ally	to	defenders	of	primitivism,	and	how	primi-
tivism	 is	a	 favorable	view	 for	Tarski	 to	hold.	 I	 conclude	by	showing	
how	we	can	use	primitivism	to	help	frame	and	respond	to	some	famil-
iar	charges,	due	to	Putnam	and	Etchemendy,	that	have	been	brought	
against	the	merits	of	Tarski’s	project.
2. Primitivism About Truth
The	primitivist	theory	of	truth	that	I	shall	be	addressing	offers	a	sub-
stantive	account	of	the	concept	of	truth.	The	theory	is	substantive	(i. e.,	
non-deflationary)	 in	 that	 it	admits	 that	 truth	 is	a	philosophically	 im-
portant	notion,	 one	 that	has	 explanatory	 value	 that	 outstrips	 its	 lin-
guistic	 and	expressive	 features.	By	 contrast,	 deflationary	 theories	of	
truth	typically	hold	that	all	there	is	to	the	theory	of	truth	is	an	account	
of	 truth’s	utility	 in	disquotation,	 forming	generalizations,	expressing	
infinite	 conjunctions	 and	 disjunctions,	 etc.	 Hence,	 for	 deflationists,	
truth	has	no	explanatory	role	to	play	in	philosophy;	the	truth	predicate	
is	merely	of	expressive use	in	giving	accounts	of	other	notions	such	as	
assertion,	belief,	and	meaning.4
Furthermore,	the	primitivism	I	am	defending	involves	most	funda-
mentally	 the	 concept	 of	 truth,	 as	opposed	 to	 the	property	 of	 truth	 (or	
words	like	‘true’	and	‘truth’).	Whether	or	not	the	property	of	truth	should	
be	understood	in	a	“metaphysically	robust”	way	is	a	separate	question,	
and	one	that	I	shall	set	aside	for	present	purposes.5	Discussion	of	the	
property	of	truth	is	a	fundamentally	metaphysical	enterprise	that	con-
cerns	the	feature(s)	that	truth	bearers	possess	when	they’re	true,	and	
4.	 See,	e. g.,	chapter	3	of	Horwich	1990,	Field	1994,	and	Williams	1999.
5.	 In	my	forthcoming,	I	defend	a	metaphysically deflationist	account	of	the	prop-
erty	of	 truth:	 I	 argue	 that	 truth	 is	 best	 understood	merely	 as	 an	abundant 
property,	and	not	a	sparse	property,	regardless	of	how	one	might	draw	that	
distinction.	See	Lewis	1983	for	an	account	of	sparse	and	abundant	properties.
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correspondence	theorists	(though	not	pragmatists	or	coherentists).	In	
fact,	Tarski	thinks	his	work	outperforms	correspondence	theory:	“I	do	
not	have	any	doubts	that	our	formulation	does	conform	to	the	intui-
tive	content	of	that	of	Aristotle.	I	am	less	certain	regarding	the	latter	
[correspondence]	 formulations	 of	 the	 classical	 conception,	 for	 they	
are	very	vague	indeed”	(1944:	360).
By	offering	a	precise	definition	of	truth,	Tarski	is	hoping	to	make	
the	notion	safe	from	those	who	have	voiced	skepticism	about	the	very	
idea	of	truth.	Semantic	concepts	like	truth,	Tarski	writes,
have	been	treated	for	a	long	time	with	a	certain	amount	
of	suspicion.	From	a	historical	standpoint,	this	suspicion	
is	to	be	regarded	as	completely	justified.	For	although	the	
meaning	of	semantic	concepts	as	they	are	used	in	every-
day	language	seems	to	be	rather	clear	and	understandable,	
still	all	attempts	to	characterize	this	meaning	in	a	general	
and	exact	way	miscarried.	(1944:	346;	cf.	1956b:	401)
Bearing	in	mind	that	Tarski’s	work	on	truth	was	developed	in	the	hey-
day	of	 logical	positivism,	his	concern	here	is	understandable.	His	in-
tent	is	to	offer	a	precise	definition	of	truth	that	is	free	of	any	“alleged	
metaphysical	implications”,	so	that	any	lingering	distrust	in	the	notion	
of	truth	may	“evaporate”	(1944:	364;	cf.	1956a:	252).
Part	of	the	project	of	making	the	notion	of	truth	“safe”	for	philoso-
phy	and	science	involves	developing	a	metaphysically	neutral	account	
of	the	concept;	the	other	crucial	part	is	showing	that	the	notion	is	not	
infected	with	paradox.	The	semantic	paradoxes	—	including,	most	no-
toriously,	the	liar	paradox	—	threaten	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	
the	notion	of	truth.	To	see	why,	consider	that	in	order	to	ensure	that	
the	semantic	conception	of	truth	conforms	to	the	classical	Aristotelian	
conception,	Tarski	offers	his	famous	adequacy	condition.	In	order	for	
a	given	language’s	definition	of	truth	to	be	adequate	it	must,	for	every	
sentence	of	the	language,	imply	an	instance	of	the	schema:
(T)	 X	is	true	if	and	only	if	p.
Tarski’s	definitions	are	tested.	Tarski	is	rightly	skeptical	that	that	basic	
notion	admits	of	any	precise	definition;	but	that	does	not	mean	that	
he	thinks	there	is	no	such	notion.	As	we	shall	see,	Tarski	thinks	that	
we	 do	 have	 an	 intuitive	 conception	 of	 truth	 (however	 vague	 or	 ill-
defined)	that	is	prior	to	how	it	is	employed	in	language.	That	concep-
tion	is	the	primitivist’s	focus.
For	our	purposes,	 the	dimensions	of	primitivism	most	relevant	 to	
Tarski’s	work	on	truth	are	truth’s	indefinability,	explanatory	value,	meta-
physically	neutral	character,	and	relationship	to	the	T-sentences.	These	
aspects	of	the	primitivist’s	conception	of	truth	are	shared	with	Tarski’s	
basic	perspective	on	truth,	and	will	form	the	basis	of	our	discussion.
3. Tarski’s Theory of Truth
In	his	 seminal	work	on	 truth,	Tarski	 (1944,	 1956a)	 advances	 and	de-
fends	what	he	calls	the	“semantic	conception”	of	truth.	His	main	goal	
is	to	offer	a	satisfactory	definition	of	truth	for	a	language	that	(i)	avoids	
paradox,	(ii)	deflects	positivist	skepticism,	and	(iii)	remains	true	to	our	
“classical	conception”	of	truth.
Consider	first	the	third	desideratum.	“The	desired	definition,”	Tar-
ski	writes,	 “does	not	 aim	 to	 specify	 the	meaning	of	 a	 familiar	word	
used	to	denote	a	novel	notion;	on	the	contrary,	it	aims	to	catch	hold	
of	 the	actual	meaning	of	an	old	notion”	 (1944:	341).	The	old	notion	
is	 the	 intuitive	 view	 of	 truth	 that	 Tarski	 attributes	 to	 Aristotle,	 and	
which	he	thinks	contemporary	correspondence	theorists	are	attempt-
ing	to	uphold.	According	to	Aristotle,	“A	falsity	is	a	statement	of	that	
which	is	that	it	is	not,	or	of	that	which	is	not	that	it	is;	and	a	truth	is	
a	statement	of	that	which	is	that	it	is,	or	of	that	which	is	not	that	it	is	
not”	(1966:	70;	1011b25–28).	Tarski	saw	his	work	as	offering	“a	more	
precise	expression	of	our	intuitions”	to	the	effect	that	truth	somehow	
consists	in	a	kind	of	correspondence	with	reality	(1944:	343;	cf.	1956a:	
153).	Hence,	it’s	understandable	why	many	have	taken	Tarski’s	work	to	
motivate	—	or	even	just	be	—	a	kind	of	correspondence	theory	of	truth.
So	Tarski	clearly	thinks	that	his	work	aims	to	do	justice	to	our	clas-
sical	 conception	of	 truth,	 a	goal	 that	he	 takes	himself	 to	 share	with	
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that	includes	names	for	all	the	sentences	of	the	object	language	and	
other	resources	necessary	for	defining	semantic	predicates	for	the	ob-
ject	 language.	 If	 truth	is	 to	be	defined	for	some	language	O,	then	O	
cannot	include	the	truth	predicate	‘true-in-O’.	The	predicate	is	instead	
a	part	of	 the	metalanguage	M.	Because	O	does	not	 contain	 its	own	
truth	predicate,	liar	sentences	cannot	be	formulated	within	O,	and	so	
paradox	is	avoided.
Hence,	for	Tarski,	truth	is	definable	only	relative	to	certain	sorts	of	
languages.	Those	languages	cannot	be	“semantically	closed”,	which	
is	 to	 say	 that	 they	 cannot	 include	 their	 own	 semantic	 machinery,	
such	 as	 names	 for	 their	 sentences	 and	 their	 own	 truth	 predicate.	
Truth	predicates	for	a	given	object	language	can	be	defined	only	from	
within	a	metalanguage	that	is	expressively	more	powerful	than	the	
object	language.
Given	these	constraints,	we	can	now	offer	a	definition	of	‘true-in-O’	
for	any	qualified	object	language	O.	The	definition	is	constructed	via	
the	notion	of	satisfaction.	Satisfaction,	ordinarily,	is	a	relation	between	
objects	and	the	sentential	functions	that	constitute	a	given	language.	
First	we	define	the	satisfaction	relation	by	listing	out	the	most	basic	
cases:	for	example,	Socrates	satisfies	the	sentential	function	‘x	is	a	phi-
losopher’,	and	the	sequence	<Socrates,	Plato>	satisfies	the	sentential	
function	 ‘x	 is	 a	 teacher	of	y’.	We	 then	define	 satisfaction	 recursively	
by	showing	how	the	satisfaction	conditions	for	compound	sentential	
functions	(and	those	involving	quantification)	are	to	be	given	in	terms	
of	the	satisfaction	conditions	for	the	basic	functions.
For	Tarski,	the	definition	of	satisfaction	is	somewhat	more	involved,	
since	he	defines	it	as	a	relation	between	sentential	functions	and	in-
finite	sequences	of	objects.	To	see	how	the	definition	works,	we	first	
need	to	establish	a	correlation	between	variables	and	the	objects	 in	
the	infinite	sequences.	If	we	set	up	the	list	of	variables	in	the	standard	
way	(i. e.,	<a, b, c, d, …, x, y, z, a
1
,	…>),	 then	x	 is	 correlated	with	 the	
twenty-fourth	object	in	the	sequence.	Now	we	can	say	that	a	sequence	
satisfies	‘x	is	a	philosopher’	if	and	only	if	the	twenty-fourth	object	in	
the	sequence	is	such	that	it	is	a	philosopher.	A	sequence	satisfies	‘x	is	a	
The	‘X’	is	to	be	replaced	by	a	name	of	a	sentence	of	the	target	language	
whose	truth	predicate	is	being	defined,	and	‘p’	by	a	translation	of	that	
sentence	in	the	language	doing	the	defining.7	A	definition	that	meets	
this	condition	offers	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	the	truth	
of	every	sentence	of	the	language	in	question	in	a	way	that	fits	with	
Aristotle’s	 dictum	 (1944:	 344).	 The	 adequacy	 condition	 reveals	 that	
Tarski	thinks	we	do	have	a	pre-linguistic	conception	of	truth,	and	that	
any	purported	definition	of	truth	had	better	conform	to	it.8
Paradox	arises	when	we	apply	sentences	like	the	following	to	the	
truth	schema:
(L)	 The	first	named	sentence	in	section	3	of	“Tarski	and	Primi-
tivism	About	Truth”	is	not	true.
If	we	plug	(L)	into	our	schema,	we	have:
(TL)	 (L)	is	true	if	and	only	if	the	first	named	sentence	in	section	
3	of	“Tarski	and	Primitivism	About	Truth”	is	not	true.
Bearing	in	mind	the	identity	of	(L),	we	can	see	that	(TL)	is	equivalent	to:
(TL*)	(L)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(L)	is	not	true.
(TL*)	is	contradictory,	and	so	any	language	that	allows	the	formation	
of	(L)	and	meets	the	adequacy	condition	concerning	schema	(T)	will	
produce	a	contradiction	(assuming	classical	logic).
Tarski’s	positive	account	of	 truth	 is	 formulated	so	as	 to	be	 inocu-
lated	 from	paradox.	Most	 crucially,	Tarski	 offers	definitions	of	 truth	
that	are	relative to a particular language	(1944:	342).	Rather	than	offering	
a	general	definition	of	 truth	that	applies	across	all	 languages,	Tarski	
defines	language-relative	truth	predicates,	such	as	‘true-in-L
1
’,	‘true-in-
L
2
’,	and	the	like.	Secondly,	truth	cannot	be	defined	within	the	language	
for	which	 it	 is	 being	 defined.	 Instead,	 truth	must	 be	 defined	 in	 the	
metalanguage.	The	metalanguage	 for	an	object language	 is	 a	 language	
7.	 Whether	Tarski	intends	the	condition	as	a	necessary	or	sufficient	one	is	con-
tentious;	see	Patterson	2006a	for	discussion.
8.	 Cf.	Heck	1997:	541–542.
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between	 truth	and	 the	T-sentences,	 and	 the	metaphysically	neutral	
character	of	truth.
4.1. Indefinability
Primitivism	begins	with	 the	 thesis	 that	 truth	 cannot	be	defined	or	
analyzed.	So	how	can	Tarski’s	work,	which	shows	how	to	offer	pre-
cise	 definitions	 of	 truth,	motivate	 primitivism	 and	 its	 key	 commit-
ment	to	the	indefinability	of	truth?	To	resolve	this	tension,	we	need	
only	 attend	 to	 the	 limitations	 inherent	 to	 Tarski’s	 method.	 As	 we	
have	seen,	Tarski	shows	how	to	define	truth	for a particular language, 
and	only	for	languages of a particular type.	The	languages	in	question	
are	(i)	formal languages	which	are	(ii)	not	semantically closed	but	(iii)	
satisfy	the	condition	of	essential richness.	Absent	these	features,	truth	
is	indefinable.
First,	 the	 language	needs	 to	be	 formal (1956a:	 165).	This	criterion	
is	important	because	it	enables	us	to	offer	a	precise	definition	of	the	
notion	of	satisfaction,	which	relies	on	there	being	a	precise	account	of	
what	the	sentential	functions	of	the	language	are.	Tarski	writes:	“The 
problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved 
in a rigorous way only for those languages whose structure has been exactly 
specified.	For	other	languages	—	thus,	for	all	natural,	“spoken”	languag-
es	—	the	meaning	of	the	problem	is	more	or	less	vague,	and	its	solution	
can	have	only	an	approximate	character”	(1944:	347).	“Our	everyday	
language,”	Tarski	goes	on	to	say,	“is	certainly	not	one	with	an	exactly	
specified	structure.	We	do	not	know	precisely	which	expressions	are	
sentences”	(1944:	349).	Tarski	thus	draws	a	crucial	distinction	between	
natural	and	formal	languages,	and	is	explicit	that	his	methods	apply	
only	to	the	latter.
Next,	Tarski	requires	that	the	languages	for	which	truth	can	be	de-
fined	not	be	“semantically	closed”	(1944:	348).	A	semantically	closed	
language	 is,	essentially,	a	 language	that	 includes	 its	own	semantics.	
Hence,	a	semantically	closed	language	includes	names	for	all	its	con-
stitutive	 sentences;	 if	 the	 sentence	 ‘Snow	 is	 white’	 belongs	 to	 the	
language,	 so	 too	 does	 the	 name	 of	 that	 sentence,	 ‘‘Snow	 is	white’’.	
teacher	of	y’	just	in	case	the	twenty-fourth	member	of	the	sequence	is	
a	teacher	of	the	twenty-fifth	member	of	the	sequence.	Now	consider	
sentences,	which	are	just	sentential	functions	with	no	free	variables.	
Any	 sequence	 whatsoever	 satisfies	 ‘Socrates	 is	 a	 philosopher’	 and	
‘Socrates	is	a	teacher	of	Plato’,	as	they	involve	no	variables	at	all.	For	
the	existentially	quantified	sentence	‘There	is	some	x	such	that	x is	a	
philosopher’,	a	sequence	S	satisfies	it	just	in	case	there	is	a	sequence	
S’	that	differs	from	S	at	most	with	respect	to	the	objects	in	their	twen-
ty-fourth	positions,	and	whose	twenty-fourth	object	is	a	philosopher.	
So	 long	as	 there	 is	 some	philosopher	 in	existence,	 there	will	be	an	
S’	with	a	philosopher	in	the	twenty-fourth	position.	As	a	result,	 the	
existential	will	be	satisfied	by	every	infinite	sequence	should	there	be	
a	philosopher,	and	satisfied	by	no	infinite	sequence	should	there	not	
be	any	philosophers.
This	procedure	defines	the	satisfaction	relation	for	a	given	language,	
which	can	now	be	used	to	define	truth	itself.	Sentences	are	true-in-O	
if	and	only	if	they	are	satisfied
O
	by	each	and	every	infinite	sequence	of	
objects;	sentences	are	false-in-O	if	and	only	if	they	are	satisfied
O
	by	no	
object	or	sequence	of	objects	(1944:	353;	1956a:	195).	Hence	we	have	
arrived	at	Tarski’s	definition	of	truth:	true	sentences	are	those	that	are	
satisfied	by	every	infinite	sequence	of	objects.
4. Tarski and Primitivism
We	have	now	seen	Tarski’s	 semantic	 conception	of	 truth	 in	outline,	
and	the	method	he	provides	for	defining	truth	for	a	given	language.	
My	 contentions	 are	 that,	 of	 all	 the	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 truth,	
primitivism	is	the	most	compatible	with	the	semantic	conception,	and	
that	primitivists	can	take	advantage	of	Tarski’s	work	for	their	own	pur-
poses.	Traditionally,	Tarski’s	work	has	been	thought	to	motivate	either	
correspondence	accounts	or	deflationary	accounts;	I	reject	both	sug-
gestions.	To	see	why,	 let	us	 turn	now	 to	 four	crucial	aspects	of	Tar-
ski’s	work,	namely,	his	contention	that	truth	is	ultimately	indefinable,	
his	 admission	 that	 truth	 is	 explanatorily	 valuable,	 the	 relationship	
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language,	 so	 to	 speak,	 then	 the	 semantic	paradoxes	will	 be	 at	play,	
and	the	definition	won’t	succeed. 10
In	fact,	Tarski	offers	a	proof	for	why	truth	cannot	be	defined	within	
a	language	(or	from	a	metalanguage	of	the	same	or	lower	order).	Tar-
ski’s	formal	“indefinability”	proof	employs	some	of	the	same	diagonal	
reasoning	 that	 lies	 behind	Gödel’s	work	 on	 incompleteness.	 I	 shall	
offer	only	a	brief	 informal	 sketch	of	 the	proof	here,	which	basically	
presents	 the	 proof	 as	 a	 form	 of	 Grelling’s	 heterological	 paradox	 (a	
connection	Tarski	observes	at	his	1956a:	248,	footnote	2).11	For	some	
language	of	sufficient	expressive	power	L,	we	first	suppose	that	there	
is	 a	 predicate	 ‘Tr’	 such	 that	 its	 extension	 contains	 all	 and	only	 true	
sentences	of	 L.	But	we	 can	now	 form	a	new	predicate,	 ‘is	 not	Tr	of	
itself’,	and	ask	whether	it	holds	of	itself	or	not.	If	‘is	not	Tr	of	itself’	is	
not	Tr	of	 itself,	 then	 it	belongs	 in	 its	own	extension,	and	so	 is	Tr	of	
itself	after	all.	But	if	‘is	not	Tr	of	itself’	is	Tr	of	itself,	then	it	is	not	Tr	of	
itself,	given	that	the	predicate	holds	only	of	predicates	that	are	not	Tr	
of	 themselves.	Either	way,	contradiction	 follows.	The	assumption	re-
duced	to	absurdity	is	that	there	is	such	a	predicate	‘Tr’	that	contains	all	
and	only	true	sentences	of	L.	There	is	no	such	predicate,	and	so	truth	
is	not	definable	for	L.
10.	 In	 the	original	version	of	 “The	Concept	of	Truth	 in	Formalized	Languages”,	
the	 languages	 that	 satisfy	 the	 condition	 of	 essential	 richness	 are	 the	 “lan-
guages	of	finite	order”	discussed	 in	 section	4,	 such	as	 the	 language	of	 the	
calculus	of	classes	(1956a:	209),	and	simple	first-order	languages.	Languages	
that	don’t	satisfy	the	condition	are	the	languages	of	infinite	order	discussed	
in	section	5,	such	as	the	general	theory	of	classes.	For	these	languages,	the	
satisfaction	 relation	 cannot	 be	 defined	by	 the	method	previously	 outlined,	
and	so	no	Tarski-style	definition	of	truth	can	be	constructed	for	them	(1956a:	
244).	However,	Tarski	 later	 revises	his	 view	on	 this	point	 in	 the	postscript	
to	“The	Concept	of	Truth	in	Formalized	Languages”	(1956a:	268–278).	There,	
Tarski	argues	that	truth	in	languages	of	infinite	order	can	be	defined,	so	long	
as	it	is	defined	from	a	language	of	a	higher	order,	which	is	now	possible	given	
Tarski’s	embrace	of	the	transfinite.	Hence,	what	matters	for	Tarski	is	the	na-
ture	of	the	relationship	between	the	object	language	and	metalanguage,	and	
not	whether	the	object	language	in	question	is	of	finite	or	infinite	order.
11.	 For	more	formal	presentations	of	Tarski’s	proof,	see	Simmons	1990:	288–289,	
1993,	 and	 2009:	 550–553,	 Patterson	 2006a:	 16–24	 and	 2012:	 144–160,	 and	
chapter	2	of	Field	2008.	See	Martin	1968	for	more	on	Grelling’s	paradox.
Semantically	closed	languages	also	include	their	own	truth	predicate,	
whose	extension	includes	sentences	of	that	very	language.	As	a	result,	
semantically	 closed	 languages	 enable	 the	 formation	 of	 paradoxical	
liar	sentences,	which	disqualifies	them	from	Tarski’s	method.	Natural	
languages	exhibit	semantic	closure	by	way	of	 their	 “universality”:	 “A	
characteristic	feature	of	colloquial	language	(in	contrast	to	various	sci-
entific	languages)	is	its	universality.	It	would	not	be	in	harmony	with	
the	spirit	of	this	language	if	in	some	other	language	a	word	occurred	
which	could	not	be	translated	into	it”	(1956a:	164).	Hence,	in	his	posi-
tive	account,	Tarski	must	rely	on	the	object	 language/metalanguage	
distinction,	for	the	truth	predicate	to	be	defined	cannot	belong	to	the	
language	to	which	it	applies.
One	final	criterion	remains:	 the	metalanguage	defining	truth	for	
its	object	language	must	satisfy	the	condition	of	“essential	richness”.	
What	is	required	is	that	the	metalanguage	doing	the	defining	be	es-
sentially	 richer	 than	 the	object	 language.	Tarski	notes	 that	 it	 is	not	
easy	to	give	a	precise	characterization	of	essential	richness.9	What	he	
does	say	 is	 that	 “If	we	 restrict	ourselves	 to	 languages	based	on	 the	
logical	theory	of	types,	the	condition	for	the	meta-language	to	be	“es-
sentially	richer”	than	the	object-language	is	that	it	contain	variables	
of	a	higher	logical	type	than	those	of	the	object-language”	(1944:	352).	
If	the	metalanguage	fails	to	be	richer	than	the	object	language,	then	
an	interpretation	of	the	metalanguage	can	be	offered	within	the	ob-
ject	 language.	This,	 in	 turn,	will	 permit	 the	possibility	of	 construct-
ing	 self-referential	 sentences	 that	 enable	 the	 semantic	 antinomies	
to	resurface.	Hence,	the	condition	of	essential	richness	is	in	place	in	
order	to	ensure	that	the	right	sort	of	relationship	exists	between	the	
object	language	and	the	metalanguage.	The	metalanguage	needs	to	
be	richer	than	the	object	language	so	that	it	can	offer	a	“broader”	or	
“higher”	perspective	from	which	to	contain	and	define	truth	in	the	ob-
ject	language.	If	the	metalanguage	is	on	the	same	level	as	the	object	
9.	 See	DeVidi	and	Solomon	1999	for	an	argument	that	no	tenable	account	of	
essential	richness	is	available	to	Tarski,	and	Ray	2005	for	a	defense	of	Tarski.
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First,	Tarski	despairs	of	 the	attempt	 to	offer	a	definition	of	 truth	
in	natural	language.	If	any	truth	predicate	were	to	express	our	most	
general	notion	of	 truth	(for	which	primitivism	hopes	to	account),	 it	
would	be	the	truth	predicate	of	natural	 language.	But	Tarski	 is	com-
mitted	to	the	view	that	his	methods	cannot	offer	a	definition	of	that	
most	wide-ranging	 truth	predicate,	 for	natural	 languages	 fail	his	 re-
quirements	 of	 formality	 and	of	 not	 being	 semantically	 closed	As	 it	
turns	out,	Tarski	thinks	the	matter	goes	beyond	indefinability:	given	
natural	language’s	semantic	universality,	the	very	consistency	of	our	
use	of	truth	within	it	is	suspect.13	Tarski	writes:	“the	very	possibility	of	
a	consistent	use	of	the	expression	‘true	sentence’	which	is	in	harmony	
with	the	laws	of	 logic	and	the	spirit	of	everyday	language	seems	to	
be	very	questionable,	and	consequently	the	same	doubt	attaches	to	
the	possibility	of	constructing	a	correct	definition	of	this	expression”	
(1956a:	165;	emphasis	removed).	Note	Tarski’s	hedged	language	here.	
He	 does	 not	 claim	 to	 have	 “proved”	 that	 truth	 in	 natural	 language	
is	indefinable	or	inconsistent.14	Later	he	writes	that	“We	may	at	best	
only	risk	the	guess	that	a	language	whose	structure	has	been	exactly	
specified	and	which	resembles	our	everyday	 language	as	closely	as	
possible	would	be	 inconsistent”	 (1944:	 349).	Absent	 a	definitive	ac-
count	of	the	nature,	structure,	and	limits	of	natural	language,	Tarski	
refuses	 to	make	 a	 definitive	 pronouncement	 on	 the	 definability	 of	
truth	in	natural	language	(1944:	347).
13.	 See	Ray	2003	and	Patterson	2006b	and	2012:	160–168	for	more	on	Tarski	and	
the	potential	inconsistency	of	natural	languages.
14.	 Davidson	repeatedly	claims	that	Tarski	has	“proved”	that	the	concept	of	truth	
is	indefinable	(1990:	285–286,	1996:	265,	269–270,	275–276),	but	it’s	unclear	
what	proof	he	is	referring	to.	Tarski’s	formal	indefinability	proof	(as	found	in	
section	5	of	Tarski	1956a)	applies	only	to	formal	languages	that	fail	to	satisfy	
the	condition	of	essential	 richness.	As	 for	Tarski’s	pessimistic	 remarks	con-
cerning	 the	definability	of	 truth	 for	natural	 languages	 (as	 found	 in	 section	
1	of	Tarski	1956a),	 these	do	not	constitute	a	proof,	as	 the	hedged	 language	
of	 the	passages	quoted	 in	 this	paragraph	 reveals.	 Like	Davidson,	 I	 believe	
that	primitivists	can	find	plenty	of	value	in	Tarski’s	work	on	definability,	but	
I	do	not	believe,	as	Davidson	appears	to,	that	Tarski	has	proven	the	truth	of	
primitivism	(or	that	Tarski	believes	himself	to	have	done	so).	See	also	García-
Carpintero	1999:	142–143.
Where	the	condition	of	essential	richness	is	not	satisfied,	truth	can-
not	be	defined	in	Tarskian	fashion.	Interestingly,	however,	Tarski	notes	
that	a	different	road	is	left	open	to	these	languages.	Though	truth	can-
not	be	defined	within	them,	we	can	introduce	a	primitive	term	‘true’	and	
then	give	an	account	of	it,	not	by	way	of	definition,	but	axiomatization:
If	we	want	 to	develop	 the	 theory	of	 truth	 in	a	meta-lan-
guage	which	does	not	satisfy	this	condition	[of	essential	
richness],	we	must	give	up	the	idea	of	defining	truth	with	
the	 exclusive	help	 of	 those	 terms	which	were	 indicated	
above	 […].	We	have	 then	 to	 include	 the	 term	 “true,”	 or	
some	other	semantic	term,	in	the	list	of	undefined	terms	
of	the	meta-language,	and	to	express	fundamental	proper-
ties	of	the	notion	of	truth	in	a	series	of	axioms.	There	is	
nothing	essentially	wrong	in	such	an	axiomatic	procedure,	
and	it	may	prove	useful	for	various	purposes.	(1944:	352)
Tarski	goes	on	to	provide	some	of	the	details	as	to	how	such	an	axi-
omatization	would	proceed	 (1956a:	255–265).	Here	we	see	one	way	
in	which	Tarski	thinks	we	can	make	use	of	a	primitive	notion	of	truth.	
For	some	of	the	languages	for	which	truth	cannot	be	defined,	we	can	
nevertheless	make	“consistent	and	correct	use”	of	the	concept	of	truth	
by	way	of	taking	truth	as	a	primitive	notion,	and	giving	it	content	by	
introducing	the	relevant	sorts	of	axioms	(1956a:	266).12
Let	us	now	 return	 the	discussion	 to	 conceptual	primitivism.	The	
primitivism	about	truth	that	I	am	defending	is	not	about	truth	as	de-
fined	for	any	particular	language.	Primitivism	concerns	our	concept	of	
truth,	which	in	turn	gives	content	to	the	various	truth	predicates	and	
operators	that	occur	in	our	natural	and	formal	languages.	So	we	must	
be	 cautious	 about	 drawing	 implications	 for	 primitivism	 too	 quickly	
from	Tarski’s	work.	Nevertheless,	a	 few	points	of	connection	are	 im-
portant	to	note.
12.	 See	Halbach	2011	and	Horsten	2011	for	contemporary	treatments	of	the	axi-
omatic	approach	to	truth.
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justice	to	our	classical,	intuitive	conception	of	truth,	they	by	no	means	
exhaust	that	conception.
Tarski’s	work	on	truth,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	offers	no	positive	so-
lution	to	the	problem	of	defining	the	notion	of	truth	at	its	most	basic	
and	fundamental	level.	As	a	result,	Tarski	would	reject	the	traditional	
substantive	theories	of	truth	that	intend	to	do	precisely	that.	In	partic-
ular,	Tarski	would	reject	the	correspondence	theorist’s	attempt	to	de-
fine	truth	in	terms	of	the	more	fundamental	notions	of	correspondence 
and	reality	(or	facts).	But	as	we	saw,	Tarski	thought	of	himself	as	partly	
engaged	in	the	same	project	as	correspondence	theorists,	in	the	sense	
that	both	are	interested	in	giving	an	account	of	truth	that	adheres	to	
the	traditional	classical	conception	of	truth.	(Hence,	as	we	have	seen,	
many	commentators	have	interpreted	Tarski	as	a	correspondence	the-
orist.)	What	we	may	appreciate	is	that	Tarski	thinks	that	the	best	way	
of	staying	true	to	the	classical	conception	is	not	by	analyzing	truth	by	
way	of	correspondence,	but	by	holding	one’s	theory	of	truth	account-
able	to	the	T-sentences	 formed	from	schema	(T).	As	a	result,	we	do	
not	see	Tarski	try	to	give	accounts	of	the	notion	of	correspondence and	
fact,	and	then	use	those	notions	to	define	truth.	Here	we	have	another	
point	of	intersection	between	Tarski	and	primitivism:	the	best	way	to	
account	for	the	“correspondence	intuition”	(i. e.,	whatever	basic	under-
standing	of	truth	it	is	that	Aristotle’s	formulation	intends	to	capture)	
is	not	by	way	of	defining	truth	in	terms	of	correspondence,	but	by	way	
of	adherence	 to	 the	T-sentences.16	Tarski,	 like	 the	primitivist,	 rejects	
correspondence	theory	(understood	as	the	project	of	trying	to	define	
truth	in	terms	of	correspondence)	as	a	way	of	understanding	the	na-
ture	of	truth	itself.	The	correspondence	theorist’s	definition	is	not	nec-
essary	for	capturing	what’s	right	about	the	thought	that	truth	in	some	
sense	consists	in	a	kind	of	correspondence	with	the	world.
16.	 Below,	and	in	my	2011,	I	go	further	and	argue	that	attention	to	truthmaking, 
and	not	the	nature	of	truth	itself,	is	vital	to	understanding	what’s	right	about	
the	“correspondence	intuition”.	The	best	way	to	capture	the	correspondence	
intuition,	I	argue,	is	not	simply	by	upholding	the	T-sentences,	but	by	offering	
in	addition	a	theory	of	truthmaking.
Despite	Tarski’s	caution,	primitivists	may	take	some	solace	 in	his	
conclusions	 regarding	 natural	 language.	 Primitivists	 claim	 that	 our	
concept	of	truth	admits	of	no	analysis.	If	any	purported	definition	of	a	
truth	predicate	were	to	falsify	that	claim,	it	would	be	a	definition	of	the	
truth	predicate	of	natural	 language.15	At	the	very	 least,	Tarski	shows	
that	his	methods	for	definition	do	not	apply	to	the	natural	language	
‘true’.	So	the	lesson	primitivists	may	draw	from	Tarski	is	that	one	po-
tential	source	of	falsification	to	their	view	is	of	no	threat.	Hence,	the	
primitivist	may	argue	as	follows:	if,	contra primitivism,	our	concept	of	
truth	is	definable,	then	the	natural	language	truth	predicate	should	ad-
mit	of	a	Tarski-like	definition.	However,	no	such	definition	is	available,	
and	 thus	our	concept	of	 truth	 is	not	definable.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
various	formal	languages	and	fragments	of	natural	language	admit	of	a	
definable	truth	predicate,	our	most	basic	and	general	concept	of	truth	
allows	 no	 such	 definition.	Of	 course,	whether	 there	 are	 other,	 non-
Tarskian	ways	of	defining	our	most	basic	concept	of	truth	is	an	open	
question,	and	Tarski	is	wise	not	to	pronounce	definitively	on	the	pos-
sibility	of	other	methods.	Still,	primitivists	may	share	Tarski’s	suspicion	
that	the	prospects	for	definition	are	grim.
The	primitivist	argues	that	our	general, inter-linguistic	notion	of	truth	
is	what	cannot	be	defined.	Tarski	appears	to	be	in	full	agreement	with	
this	particular	thesis.	His	entire	approach	to	the	theory	of	truth	can	be	
taken	as	an	argument	in	favor	of	it	(though	not,	as	we	have	seen,	some	
kind	of	conclusive	proof).	Truth	can	be	defined	only	with	respect	to	
certain	limited	kinds	of	languages.	As	for	our	most	basic	notion	of	truth,	
definition	is	not	to	be	had.	Hence,	even	though	Tarski’s	definitions	do	
15.	 I	happen	to	doubt	the	truth	of	the	antecedent	here,	since	I	believe	that	our	
concept	of	truth	is	prior	to	its	use	in	our	language,	and	is	not	fully	exhausted	
by	the	use	that	‘is	true’	plays	in	our	language.	(For	example,	it’s	not	clear	how	
a	Tarski-style	definition	of	truth	can	illuminate	what	it	means	to	say	that to as-
sert is to present as true.	Cf.	Bar-On	and	Simmons	2007	and	Textor	2010.)	But	I	
suspect	that	Davidson	believes	something	along	these	lines,	since	he	appears	
to	take	Tarski’s	negative	results	concerning	the	possibility	of	defining	a	fully	
general,	inter-linguistic	truth	predicate	to	establish	the	primitive	nature	of	our	
concept	of	truth.
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terms	of	satisfaction	at	all,	but	rather	by	a	process	of	axiomatization.	
So	we	may	conclude	that,	formally	speaking,	truth	is	not	“univocal”	as	
it	appears	in	formal	languages	that	do	or	do	not	satisfy	the	condition	
of	essential	richness.	Sometimes	truth	is	defined	in	terms	of	satisfac-
tion,	 sometimes	 it	 is	 introduced	 through	 axiomatization.	 But	 if	we	
believe	there	to	be	one	more	basic	notion	at	hand	behind	both	kinds	
of	languages,	then	we	must	reject	the	idea	that	truth	is	to	be	under-
stood	in	terms	of	the	more	fundamental	notion	of	satisfaction.	That’s	
not	 the	kind	of	analysis	 that	Tarski	offers.	Such	an	analysis	 is	what	
correspondence	theorists,	coherence	theorists,	and	pragmatists	offer.	
They	define	truth	in	terms	of	more	fundamental	notions.	But	Tarski	is	
not	engaged	in	such	a	process,	even	when	he	is	offering	definitions	
of	truth.	Consequently,	Tarski’s	work	on	truth	leaves	it	entirely	open	
how	we	are	 to	understand	 the	basic	meaning	or	 intension	of	 truth.	
The	most	natural	position	for	Tarski	to	take	is	that	we	cannot	define	
this	more	general	notion	of	truth;	here	again	we	see	Tarski	and	primi-
tivism	being	natural	allies.
All	told,	where	Tarski	shows	truth	to	be	indefinable,	primitivists	can	
readily	agree.	The	kind	of	indefinability	of	truth	that	primitivists	advo-
cate	is	precisely	the	kind	of	indefinability	that	Tarski’s	work	allows	for	
and	motivates.	Where	Tarski	 advocates	 the	 definability	 of	 truth,	 it’s	
clear	 that	 his	 definitions	 should	not	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 capturing	 the	
nature	of	 truth	 in	more	 fundamental	 terms.	That	 is	 to	say,	while	his	
definitions	represent	an	important	kind	of	formal	achievement,	they	
should	not	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 capturing	 the	 nature	 of	 truth	 in	 a	way	
similar	to	the	attempts	of	correspondence,	coherence,	and	pragmatic	
theorists.	Nor	is	there	any	reason	to	think	that	this	result	caused	Tarski	
any	despair.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section,	Tarski	puts	his	defi-
nition	to	work	in	the	service	of	a	variety	of	mathematical	and	logical	
tasks	(among	others).	Tarski’s	definitions	of	truth	are	best	appreciated	
in	light	of	these	more	formal	accomplishments.
Finally,	it’s	worth	noting	that	even	for	those	languages	where	a	Tar-
skian	definition	of	 truth	 is	 available,	 it’s	unclear	 that	his	definitions	
capture	the	real	nature	—	or	intension,	we	might	say	—	of	truth.	If	they	
don’t,	then	Tarski’s	definitions	do	not	in	any	way	conflict	with	primitiv-
ists’	claims	regarding	the	indefinability	of	truth.	For	primitivists	argue	
that	no	definition	of	truth	can	reveal	the	nature	of	truth	in	more	fun-
damental	terms.	If	Tarski	isn’t	even	intending	to	do	that	—	see	Patter-
son	2008a:	178	—	then	we	can	appreciate	how	Tarski’s	project	is	in	full	
harmony	with	primitivists’.	Tarski	defines	true	sentences,	where	they	
are	definable,	as	those	that	are	satisfied	by	every	infinite	sequence	of	
objects.	As	Tarski	shows,	this	definition	is	“materially	adequate”	and	
“formally	 correct”	 (1944:	 341,	 1956a:	 152).	That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 entails	 all	
the	T-sentences	(and	therefore	captures	our	intuitive	notion	of	truth,	
and	 not	 something	 else),	 and	 suffers	 no	 internal	 problems	 such	 as	
circularity.	 Furthermore,	 the	 definition	 captures	 the	 right	 extension:	
it	includes	all	and	only	true	sentences	of	the	language.	However,	it’s	
quite	implausible	to	think	that	Tarski’s	definitions	have	hit	on	the	cor-
rect	intension	or	meaning	of	truth.17	One	way	to	press	the	point	is	as	
follows.	Granted,	 sentences	are	 true	 if	 and	only	 if	 they	are	 satisfied	
by	all	infinite	sequences	of	objects.	But	are	they	true	because	they	are	
satisfied	by	each	and	every	infinite	sequence	of	objects?	Is	the	right	
account	of	the	truth	of	‘Snow	is	white’	that	every	infinite	sequence	sat-
isfies	it,	or	does	the	right	account	have	something	to	do	in	particular	
with	snow	and	its	color?	If	the	former	answer	seems	insufficient	(as	it	
does	to	me),	then	there	is	reason	to	suppose	that	Tarski’s	definitions	
were	never	intended	to	capture	the	nature	of	truth	and	its	intension	in	
more	fundamental	or	basic	terms.18
This	 conclusion	 becomes	 all	 the	 more	 apparent	 given	 Tarski’s	
recognition	that	for	some	languages,	truth	is	not	to	be	cashed	out	in	
17.	 For	one	thing,	Tarski’s	discussion	of	indefinability	in	section	5	of	Tarski	1956a	
reveals	that	he	thinks	his	satisfaction-based	method	of	definition	is	in	a	cer-
tain	 sense	 arbitrary.	Appealing	 to	 satisfaction	 for	 languages	of	 finite	order	
works,	so	he	uses	it.	But	Tarski	is	open	to	the	idea	that	had	satisfaction	not	
worked,	some	other	notion	might	have.
18.	 Cf.	Patterson	2006b:	162–163.
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on	the	basis	of	its	definition	—	the	concept	of	truth	is	ster-
ile,	he	must	accept	the	further	conclusion	that	all	defined	
notions	are	sterile.	But	this	outcome	is	so	absurd	and	so	
unsound	historically	that	any	comment	on	it	is	unneces-
sary.	In	fact,	I	am	rather	inclined	to	agree	with	those	who	
maintain	that	the	moments	of	greatest	creative	advance-
ment	in	science	frequently	coincide	with	the	introduction	
of	new	notions	by	means	of	definition.	(1944:	359)
Hence,	Tarski	resists	any	suggestion	that	truth’s	importance	is	in	any	
way	compromised	by	establishing	its	definability	or	subsequent	elim-
inability	from	the	language.	In	fact,	truth	won’t	even	belong	to	those	
languages	for	which	truth	can	be	defined!	Nonetheless,	understand-
ing	the	notion	of	truth	for	a	language	is	paramount	for	understanding	
that	language.
For	Tarski,	the	importance	of	seeking	a	definition	of	truth	is	not	so	
as	to	eliminate	the	notion,	but	to	put	it	to	work.	What	can	truth	do	for	
us?	Tarski	is	adamant	that	his	work	on	truth	and	semantics	“can	find	ap-
plications	in	various	domains	of	intellectual	activity”	(1944:	364).	Tarski	
argues	 that	his	work	 can	produce	 important	 results,	not	only	 for	phi-
losophy,	but	for	both	the	empirical	and	deductive	sciences.19	As	to	phi-
losophy,	Tarski	notes	that	his	definition	can	be	taken	to	have	addressed	
“one	of	the	fundamental	problems	of	the	theory	of	knowledge”	(1956b:	
407).	Tarski	also	thinks	that	his	approach	to	truth	plays	a	vital	role	in	“es-
tablishing	semantics	on	a	scientific	basis”	(ibid.),	and	thereby	produces	
various	empirical	and	logical	fruits.	His	research	has	obvious	direct	ram-
ifications	for	the	study	of	linguistics,	and	“indirect”	implications	for	the	
natural	sciences,	by	way	of	the	use	of	truth	and	other	semantic	notions	
within	 the	methodology	of	 science	and	scientific	 theory	construction	
and	 acceptance	 (1944:	 366–368).	 Furthermore,	 Tarski	 points	 out	 that	
his	definition	of	truth	leads	to	important	results	in	logic,	mathematics,	
and	metamathematics	(1944:	368–369).	His	definition	of	 truth	can	be	
19.	 See	also	Soames	1999:	100–107.
4.2. Explanatory value
The	previous	section	serves	 to	 illustrate	some	of	 the	grounds	Tarski	
has	for	rejecting	the	traditional	substantive	theories	of	truth	(grounds	
that	he	may	happily	share	with	primitivists).	Those	theories	purport	
to	analyze	in	full	our	concept	of	truth,	a	project	that	Tarski	rejects	and	
may	well	deem	impossible.	In	this	section	we	can	turn	to	why	Tarski	
can	also	side	with	primitivists	(and	now	against	deflationists)	in	favor	
of	truth’s	explanatory	capabilities.
The	first	point	to	notice	is	that	Tarski	explicitly	rejects	the	idea	that	
if	truth	were	to	be	definable	and	so	in	principle	eliminable	from	lan-
guage	without	expressive	loss,	then	the	notion	of	truth	would	thereby	
be	“sterile”:
Consequently,	the	term	“true”	when	occurring	in	a	simple	
sentence	of	the	form	“X is true”	can	easily	be	eliminated,	
and	 the	 sentence	 itself,	which	belongs	 to	 the	meta-lan-
guage,	can	be	replaced	by	an	equivalent	sentence	of	the	
object-language	[…].	Some	people	have	therefore	urged	
that	the	term	“true”	in	the	semantic	sense	can	always	be	
eliminated,	and	that	for	this	reason	the	semantic	concep-
tion	of	truth	is	altogether	sterile	and	useless.	And	since	
the	same	considerations	apply	to	other	semantic	notions,	
the	conclusion	has	been	drawn	that	semantics	as	a	whole	
is	a	purely	verbal	game	and	at	best	only	a	harmless	hob-
by.	(1944:	358)
Not	all	deflationists	would	draw	the	conclusion	that	truth	is	a	sterile	
and	useless	 concept,	 but	 the	 standard	deflationist	 line	 is	 that	 care-
ful	attention	to	truth’s	logical	and	linguistic	role	does	reveal	truth	to	
carry	 little	 philosophical	 or	 explanatory	worth	 (e. g.,	Horwich	 1990	
and	Williams	1999).	But	Tarski	detects	a	fallacy	in	inferring	sterility	
from	definability:
If,	however,	anyone	continues	to	urge	that	—	because	of	
the	 theoretical	 possibility	 of	 eliminating	 the	word	 “true”	
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most	fundamental	principles	about	truth,	in	terms	of	which	we	grasp	
the	concept	(e. g.,	Horwich	1990).20	T-sentences	thus	play	the	role	that	
other	principles	(which	might	involve	correspondence,	coherence,	or	
utility)	play	in	other	theories.	Primitivists	reject	the	idea	that	there	are	
any	fundamental	principles	about	truth,	in	terms	of	which	the	concept	
can	be	defined,	reduced,	or	analyzed,	and	so	must	reject	this	deflation-
ary	interpretation	of	the	T-sentences.	On	this	point,	Tarski	can	also	be	
found	to	side	with	primitivists.
The	 T-sentences	 figure	 into	 Tarski’s	 account	 of	 truth	 by	 way	 of	
serving	as	a	kind	of	“check”	on	the	material	adequacy	of	any	purport-
ed	definition	of	truth;	theories	meet	the	condition	when	they	entail	
all	of	the	T-sentences.	The	notion	of	material	adequacy	at	hand	is	not	
simply	extensional	adequacy	(Patterson	2012:	109–111).	Tarski’s	inter-
est	is	instead	in	defining	relativized	truth	predicates	that	conform	to	
our	intuitive	notion	of	truth.	Entailing	the	T-sentences	is	one	way	of	
guaranteeing	 that	 the	notion	defined	hasn’t	 strayed	 away	 from	our	
most	basic	notion	of	truth.	As	Davidson	puts	the	point,	the	T-sentenc-
es	“alone	constitute	an	unmistakable	test	that	a	theory	has	captured	a	
concept	of	truth	we	are	interested	in”	(1973:	77).
If	 the	 T-sentences	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 the	 fundamental	 facts	 about	
truth,	in	terms	of	which	truth	may	be	defined,	then	Tarski’s	adequacy	
condition	is	empty.	If	the	deflationary	conception	of	truth	is	defined	
by	 the	T-sentences,	 then	of	 course	 the	deflationary	conception	will	
meet	the	adequacy	condition	by	entailing	them.	Hence,	the	deflation-
ary	perspective	on	 the	 truth	schema	and	 its	T-sentences	makes	Tar-
ski’s	adequacy	condition	vacuous	and	trivial.	Since	Tarski	did	not	take	
the	condition	to	be	empty,	we	may	appreciate	at	once	how	Tarski	re-
jects	the	idea	that	the	T-sentences	provide	the	most	fundamental	facts	
about	 truth.21	Primitivists,	 like	Tarski,	maintain	that	 the	T-sentences	
20.	See	also	the	deflationary	definitions	of	 truth	that	 involve	the	truth	schema,	
as	found	(but	not	always	endorsed)	in	Leeds	1978:	121,	Field	1986:	58,	Resnik	
1990:	412,	and	David	1994:	107.
21.	 I	 hasten	 to	 add	 that	 this	 fact	 also	 shows	 that	 Tarski	 does	 not	 think	 of	 the	
T-sentences	 as	 being	 empirically	 empty	 logical	 truths,	 contra	 Putnam	 1985,	
Etchemendy	1988,	and	Heck	1997.	If	they	were,	then	the	adequacy	condition	
used	to	prove	the	metalogical	versions	of	the	laws	of	non-contradiction	
and	of	excluded	middle	(1956a:	197;	cf.	1944:	354).	It	can	also	illuminate	
the	notions	of	provability,	definability,	consistency,	and	completeness	
(1944:	368–369).	In	summarizing	the	potential	positive	benefits	of	his	
approach	to	truth	for	the	deductive	sciences,	Tarski	writes	that	“the	es-
tablishment	of	scientific	semantics,	and	in	particular	 the	definition	of	
truth,	enables	us	to	match	the	negative	results	in	the	field	of	metamath-
ematics	with	corresponding	positive	ones,	and	in	that	way	to	fill	to	some	
extent	the	gaps	which	have	been	revealed	in	the	deductive	method	and	
in	the	very	structure	of	deductive	science”	(1956b:	408).
In	short,	Tarski	believes	that	the	notion	of	truth	can	play	an	impor-
tant,	explanatory	role	in	other	areas	of	thought,	inside	and	outside	of	
philosophy.	Rather	than	thinking	of	his	project	as	having	deflationary	
results,	Tarski	believed	his	work	 to	be	quite	 constructive,	 and	only	
increase	 the	 import	of	 the	notion	of	 truth.	This	attitude	 toward	 the	
theory	 of	 truth	 is	 shared	by	 primitivism.	 For	 primitivists,	 truth	 is	 a	
foundational	notion;	its	importance	is	demonstrated	by	showing	how	
the	notion	can	be	put	to	work	in	other	kinds	of	intellectual	projects	
(including	 those	 that	Tarski	 addresses).	One	of	 the	 reasons	 to	 take	
some	notion	as	primitive	 is	 to	show	how	it	can	then	be	put	 to	vari-
ous	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	work.	 Primitivists	may	 grant	 to	 deflation-
ists	 that	 ‘true’	plays	various	kinds	of	 logical	and	expressive	roles	 in	
ordinary	language,	and	that	in	many	cases	expressions	with	‘true’	are	
equivalent	to	expressions	that	lack	it.	But	primitivists	and	Tarski	are	
in	agreement	that	such	facts	about	truth	do	not	exhaust	all	that	there	
is	to	be	said	about	it;	on	the	contrary,	truth	is	a	central,	key	notion	that	
is	highly	relevant	to	our	understanding	of	other	important	notions	in	
science,	mathematics,	and	philosophy.
4.3. T-sentences
A	third	connection	between	primitivism	and	Tarski	(and	one	that	also	
serves	 to	 further	 distance	 him	 from	 deflationism)	 involves	 the	 rela-
tionship	 between	 the	 T-sentences	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 truth.	 A	 stan-
dard	deflationary	interpretation	of	the	T-sentences	is	that	they	are	the	
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their	theory.	Consider	also	mathematical	and	analytic	truths:	to	what	
are	 they	supposed	 to	correspond?	My	 intention	 is	not	 to	show	that	
such	questions	cannot	be	answered;	rather,	it’s	that	correspondence	
theories	immediately	face	a	distinctively	metaphysical	challenge	that	
Tarski	 and	 primitivists	 can	 avoid.	 Any	 fully	 fleshed	 out	 correspon-
dence	theory	must	give	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	nature	of	the	
corresponding	objects,	and	in	so	doing	will	impose	a	particular	meta-
physical	view	onto	the	nature	of	truth.
Similarly,	coherence	theorists	and	pragmatic	theorists	can	be	un-
derstood	as	 incorporating	partisan	metaphysical	views	into	their	ac-
counts	 of	 truth.	 If	 the	 truth	of	 ‘Snow	 is	white’	 consists	 in	 a	 certain	
kind	of	coherence	between	our	beliefs,	then	this	highly	suggests	an	
(at	least	in	part)	idealist	metaphysics	that	connects	the	whiteness	of	
snow	with	features	of	what	other	beliefs	we	hold.	If	the	truth	of	my	
beliefs	is	in	part	a	function	of	what	other	beliefs	I	hold,	then	it’s	not	
the	 case	 that	 the	 truth	of	 ‘Snow	 is	white’	 is	 a	matter	 fully	 indepen-
dent	of	me	and	my	particular	beliefs.	Likewise,	if	the	truth	of	‘Snow	is	
white’	is	in	part	a	function	of	what	it’s	useful	for	me	to	believe,	then	
the	 truth	of	 the	matter	 is	again	mind-dependent.	Hence,	coherence	
and	 pragmatic	 accounts	 of	 truth,	 just	 like	 correspondence	 theories,	
cannot	embrace	the	metaphysical	neutrality	inherent	to	primitivism	
and	Tarski’s	semantic	conception	of	truth.
To	say	that	Tarski’s	theory	of	truth	is	neutral	is	to	allow	that	it	could 
be	paired	with	the	metaphysical	ideas	underlying	the	traditional	sub-
stantive	theories	of	truth,	if	one	were	so	inclined.	Hence,	Tarski’s	work	
on	truth	does	not	show	that	the	metaphysical	concerns	of	interest	to	
the	traditional	theorists	of	truth	are	nonsense,	or	that	they	disappear	
once	we	adopt	the	semantic	conception.	It’s	just	that	these	concerns	
are	better	explored	not	from	the	perspective	of	the	theory	of	truth,	but	
from	the	theory	of	truthmaking (or	some	other	metaphysical	approach).	
According	to	Tarski,	any	adequate	theory	of	truth	will	usher	forth	the	
equivalences	like
express	important	facts	about	truth.	(And,	perhaps	more	to	the	point,	
important	facts	about	the	truth conditions	of	sentences.)	But	one’s	the-
ory	of	truth	needs	to	explain	the	T-sentences	(and	not	the	other	way	
around,	as	deflationists	maintain).
4.4. Metaphysical neutrality
One	final	core	issue	on	which	Tarski	and	primitivists	are	in	complete	
agreement	is	the	metaphysically	neutral	nature	of	truth.	To	accept	Tar-
ski’s	approach	to	truth	is	not	to	take	on	any	metaphysical	stance,	such	
as	realism	or	anti-realism:	“we	may	accept	the	semantic	conception	of	
truth	without	giving	up	any	epistemological	attitude	we	may	have	had;	
we	may	remain	naive	realists,	critical	realists	or	idealists,	empiricists	or	
metaphysicians	—	whatever	we	were	before.	The	semantic	conception	
is	 completely	 neutral	 toward	 all	 these	 issues”	 (1944:	 362).	 Likewise,	
taking	 truth	 to	be	a	primitive,	undefinable	concept	also	 requires	no	
particular	metaphysical	stance.
By	way	 of	 contrast,	 it’s	 instructive	 to	 understand	 the	 traditional	
substantive	theories	of	truth	as	building	metaphysical	stances	directly	
into	their	accounts	of	truth.22	For	correspondence	theories,	something	
is	true	just	in	case	it	stands	in	the	correspondence	relation	to	some	
fact.	As	a	result,	truths	are	from	the	outset	entangled	with	ontology.	If	
p	is	to	be	true,	there	must	be	some	entity	E	for	it	to	correspond	to.	For	
correspondence	 theory,	 there	 is	no	 truth	without	 some	accompany-
ing	ontology.	This	commitment	might	seem	innocuous,	but	consider	
some	 problematic	 cases.	 Take	 the	 sentence	 ‘There	 are	 no	 hobbits’.	
One	might	think	that	this	sentence	can	be	true	without	the	benefit	of	
anything	existing:	after	all,	it	appears	that	it’s	true	because	nothing	of	a	
certain	sort	exists.	But	correspondence	theorists	must	grant	that	there	
is	some	entity	for	it	to	correspond	to,	lest	they	allow	some	truths	to	
be	true	in	spite	of	not	corresponding	to	anything,	thereby	giving	up	
would	again	be	vacuous.	See	also	Davidson	1990	and	Patterson	2008b	 for	
further	criticism	of	this	reading.
22.	Deflationary	theories	of	truth,	however,	share	the	metaphysical	neutrality	of	
the	semantic	conception	and	primitivism.
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neutral	perspective	is	yet	another	point	of	common	ground	between	
Tarski	and	primitivism.
5. Dissolving Objections
As	we	have	seen,	Tarski’s	semantic	conception	of	truth	has	sometimes	
been	 thought	 to	motivate	 correspondence	 theories,	 and	 sometimes	
deflationary	theories.	My	alternative	suggestion	is	that	Tarski’s	work	is	
best	paired	with	the	primitivist	perspective	on	truth.	Primitivists	stress	
the	indefinability	of	our	most	general	concept	of	truth,	its	explanatory	
value,	and	 its	metaphysical	neutrality.	All	of	 these	 features,	 together	
with	 primitivism’s	 perspective	 on	 the	 T-sentences,	 are	 shared	 with	
Tarski’s	 semantic	 approach	 to	 truth.	Hence,	 although	Tarski	 himself	
never	says	anything	that	commits	him	to	primitivism,	he	says	plenty	
of	 things	 that	distinguish	him	 from	both	 the	 traditional	 substantive	
theories	 and	deflationary	 theories.	 If	Tarski	were	 to	 accept	 any	 con-
temporary	account	of	our	general	concept	of	truth,	primitivism	would	
be	the	view	most	acceptable	to	him.24	Likewise,	primitivists	can	find	
support	for	their	views	inside	Tarski’s	work.	Tarski	argues	that	his	own	
method	of	definition	cannot	be	applied	to	the	general	notion	of	truth	
that	most	interests	primitivists.	Thus,	Tarski	leaves	open	the	possibility	
that	primitivism	offers	the	best	understanding	of	our	concept	of	truth.
what	I	have	called	the	“correspondence	intuition”.	If	the	correspondence	in-
tuition	has	any	metaphysical	pull	to	it	—	and	I	believe	that	it	does	—	then	it	
ought	not	 receive	any	 support	 from	a	metaphysically	neutral	view.	On	my	
view,	consistency	with	the	T-sentences	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient	for	cap-
turing	the	correspondence	intuition.	For	this	reason,	I	argue	in	my	2011	that	
deflationists	cannot	capture	the	correspondence	intuition	by	their	conformity	
to	the	truth	schema	alone,	contra	Horwich	1990.	What’s	needed,	in	addition,	
is	a	particular	view	about	what	makes	truths	true.
24.	 Patterson	observes	that	“Tarski	had	no	specific	concerns	at	all	about	the	con-
tent	of	 the	concept	of	 truth	 itself”	(2012:	139).	On	Patterson’s	view,	Tarski’s	
fundamental	interest	is	not	in	analyzing	our	intuitive	notion	of	truth,	but	in	
showing	how	to	consistently	and	adequately	introduce	a	truth	predicate	(that	
conforms	to	the	intuitive	notion)	into	certain	kinds	of	languages.	If	so,	then	
Tarski	would	have	been	officially	neutral	regarding	primitivism;	my	conten-
tion	is	that	the	view	is	open	and	amenable	to	him,	if	he	were	to	throw	his	hat	
into	this	particular	philosophical	ring.
‘Socrates	is	a	philosopher’	is	true	if	and	only	if	Socrates	is	
a	philosopher.
What	we	have	here	is	one	sentence	(from	the	language	doing	the	ana-
lyzing)	being	used	to	give	the	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	
the	 truth	 of	 another	 (not	 necessarily	 distinct)	 mentioned	 sentence	
(from	the	language	being	analyzed).	But	to	say	that	‘Socrates	is	a	phi-
losopher’	is	true	if	and	only	if	Socrates	is	a	philosopher	is	to	say	noth-
ing	whatsoever	about	what	it	is,	if	anything,	that	makes	‘Socrates	is	a	
philosopher’	true.	What	we	can’t	say	is	this:	Socrates	is	a	philosopher	
makes	 true	 ‘Socrates	 is	 a	 philosopher’.	 That’s	 ungrammatical	 non-
sense.	And	we	must	be	extremely	cautious	in	saying	that	what	makes	
‘Socrates	 is	a	philosopher’	 true	 is	 that	Socrates	 is	a	philosopher.	For	
what	does	 ‘that	Socrates	 is	a	philosopher’	refer	to?	It	can’t	refer	to	a	
proposition,	because	propositions	don’t	make	true	the	sentences	that	
express	them.	If	it	refers	to	something	like	a	“fact”	or	“obtaining	state	of	
affairs”,	then	we	have	entities	that	can	serve	as	truthmakers;	but	notice	
that	this	view	is	now	burdened	with	some	serious	metaphysical	com-
mitments,	and	to	say	that	all	sentences	are	made	true	by	such	entities	
takes	one	perilously	close	to	a	traditional	correspondence	theory.
Ultimately,	the	question	of	what,	if	anything,	makes	‘Socrates	is	a	
philosopher’	true	is	a	separate	metaphysical	question	left	unanswered	
by	everything	that	Tarski	says.	Perhaps	it’s	made	true	by	a	fact,	or	state	
of	affairs	(Armstrong	1997),	or	by	a	trope	(Lowe	2007),	or	by	Socrates	
under	a	counterpart	relation	(Lewis	2003).	Perhaps	it	doesn’t	have	a	
truthmaker	at	all	(Lewis	2001).	Perhaps	it’s	made	true	by	the	relations	
that	obtain	between	my	beliefs,	or	by	the	utility	to	me	that	would	exist	
were	I	to	believe	what	the	sentence	says.	Regardless	of	which	meta-
physical	view	is	correct,	we	can	all	agree	that	the	Tarskian	equivalence	
above	is	true.	Metaphysical	disputes	regarding	what	it	is	that	makes	
truth	 bearers	 true	 are	 best	 explored	 from	 within	 the	 metaphysical	
enterprise	 of	 truthmaking,	 and	not	 the	 theory	of	 truth	 itself. 23 This	
23.	 It’s	worth	noting	that	Tarski’s	claim	to	metaphysical	neutrality	is	in	some	ten-
sion	with	his	claim	 to	be	doing	 justice	 to	our	classical	 conception	of	 truth,	
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Tarski	 in	order	 to	 learn	 the	ultimate	nature	of	 truth,	 for	Tarski	may	
well	 agree	with	primitivists	 that	 no	 such	 theory	 can	be	provided.26 
However,	this	doesn’t	show	that	Tarski’s	work	fails	as	a	“philosophi-
cal”	theory,	for	that	response	presupposes	that	the	only	philosophical	
theory	of	truth	worth	having	is	a	reductive,	non-primitivist	one.	We	
may	grant	to	Putnam	that	equivalences	like	‘‘Snow	is	white’	is	true-in-
L	if	and	only	if	snow	is	white’	(even	if	read	in	Putnam’s	problematic	
way,	as	necessary	logical	truths)	do	not	reveal	at	all	the	real	nature	of	
truth.	But	that	was	never	their	purpose.	Tarski	offers	his	definitions	of	
truth	in	order	to	provide	semanticists,	logicians,	mathematicians,	in-
terpreters	of	science,	and	others	predicates	that	are	safe	from	paradox	
and	metaphysical	baggage,	and	yet	 remain	 true	 to	our	basic	under-
standing	of	the	notion	of	truth.	The	T-sentences,	again,	provide	a	kind	
of	 “check”	 that	his	definitions	conform	to	 that	basic	understanding;	
they	are	not	themselves	supposed	to	be	defining	our	basic	concept	of	
truth.	Putnam’s	objection	misunderstands	 the	 role	 that	T-sentences	
play	in	the	theory	of	truth,	and	supposes	Tarski	to	be	up	to	something	
that	he	doesn’t	think	can	be	done.
Etchemendy	 (1988)	has	also	voiced	a	number	of	 influential	 crit-
icisms	 of	 Tarski’s	work.	He	 argues	 that	 Tarski’s	 project	 of	 defining	
truth	 is	 actually	 at	 odds	with	 the	 project	 of	 understanding	 seman-
tics,	 despite	 appearances	 to	 the	 contrary.	 Etchemendy	 argues	 that	
Tarski,	 in	 order	 to	 define	 a	 notion	 of	 truth	 that	 does	 not	 succumb	
to	paradox,	effectively	stipulates	a	definition	of	truth,	and	any	such	
stipulative	 definition	 cannot	 contain	 the	 empirical	 information	 es-
sential	to	the	semantic	theory	of	a	language.	Tarski’s	definitions	will	
usher	forth	equivalences	such	as	‘‘Snow	is	white’	is	true	(in	the	Tar-
skian	sense)	if	and	only	if	snow	is	white’,	guaranteeing	that	truth	(in	
the	 Tarskian	 sense)	 gets	 the	 right	 extension.	 But	 this	 equivalence	
doesn’t	give	us	any	semantic	information	about	the	English	sentence	
‘Snow	is	white’.	To	do	that,	we	need	not	the	(supposedly)	logical	truth	
26.	Putnam	briefly	suggests	that	the	primitivist	line	is	not	open	to	Tarski	(1985:	
72),	but	he	does	not	say	why.	Perhaps	he	has	in	mind	the	sorts	of	consider-
ations	Etchemendy	considers,	as	discussed	below.
Tarski’s	reticence	regarding	what	we	should	say	about	our	natural	
language	understanding	of	truth	has	led	several	philosophers	to	protest	
that	by	restricting	his	positive	views	to	formal	languages,	Tarski’s	work	
fails	to	be	of	any	philosophical	interest.	Armed	with	our	primitivist	per-
spective	on	Tarski’s	views,	we	can	confront	 these	objections	directly.	
For	example,	according	to	Max	Black,	“The	philosophical	relevance	of	
[Tarski’s]	work	will	depend	upon	the	extent	to	which	something	similar	
[to	his	formal	language	definitions]	can	be	done	for	colloquial	English”	
(1948:	 56).	 But	 this	 response	 begs	 the	 question	 against	 primitivism:	
Tarski’s	work	on	the	limits	of	definability	encourages	the	thought	that	
truth	as	conceived	in	ordinary	thought	and	speech	is	not	definable,	and	
this	fact	is	of	profound	philosophical	relevance.	The	question	of	which	
of	our	concepts	are	foundational	and	fundamental	is	an	important	one;	
Black,	to	the	contrary,	assumes	that	showing	something	to	be	indefin-
able	and	primitive	cannot	be	philosophically	relevant.
Other	philosophers	have	also	objected	to	Tarski’s	theory	of	truth	on	
the	grounds	that	it	has	little	to	offer,	philosophically	speaking.	In	the	
most	infamous	case,	Putnam	declares	that	“As	a	philosophical	account	
of	truth,	Tarski’s	theory	fails	as	badly	as	it	is	possible	for	an	account	to	
fail”	(1985:	64),	and	denies	that	what	Tarski	defines	“is	in	any	way	simi-
lar	in	meaning”	to	our	intuitive	use	of	truth	(1983:	37).	Putnam’s	worry	
derives	from	his	view	of	Tarski’s	truth	predicates,	which	(according	to	
Putnam)	apply	 to	 sentences	 regardless	of	what	 they	mean.	 In	effect,	
whether	or	not	a	sentence	possesses	Tarskian	“truth”	doesn’t	depend	
on	what	 it	means,	and	so	Tarskian	 “truth”	can’t	be	 real	 truth,	which	
does	depend	on	meaning.
This	is	not	the	place	to	evaluate	Putnam’s	objection	in	full;25	what	
we	may	 appreciate	 instead	 is	 how	 a	 Putnam-style	worry	 simply	 dis-
solves	when	we	view	Tarski’s	work	through	the	primitivist	lens.	Tarski’s	
ambitions	did	not	include	offering	anything	like	a	reductive	definition	
in	the	mold	of	the	traditional	theories	of	truth.	One	should	not	turn	to	
25.	 For	further	discussion,	see	Davidson	1990,	Raatikainen	2003	and	2008,	and	
Patterson	2008a	and	2008b.	See	also	 the	closely	 related	discussions	 in	So-
ames	1984,	Etchemendy	1988,	and	Heck	1997.
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least,	about	the	truth	conditions	of	our	sentences),	and	not	vacuous	
logical	truths.	So	whereas	Etchemendy	sees	a	prior,	primitivist	concep-
tion	of	truth	as	somehow	conflicting	with	Tarski’s	project,	the	correct	
interpretation	is	that	Tarski’s	project	relies	on	there	being	such	a	prior	
conception.	As	I	have	argued,	primitivism	about	that	prior	conception	
is	the	view	that	is	most	consonant	with	Tarski’s	project.
What	remains	to	be	seen	is	whether	primitivists	can	convince	Tar-
ski	 that	 our	use	of	 truth	 in	ordinary	 thought	 can	be	 consistent.	Tar-
ski	worried	that	our	use	of	truth	in	natural	language	was	inconsistent,	
though	he	stopped	short	of	definitively	drawing	 that	conclusion.	So	
the	question	arises	how	the	primitivist	may	approach	the	semantical	
paradoxes	as	they	arise	in	natural	language.	That	topic	—	primitivism	
and	paradox	—	is	one	that	we	shall	have	to	take	up	elsewhere.27, 28
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